媒體關(guān)注｜IPP專家：中美的北極關(guān)系，已進(jìn)入“深水區(qū)”

IPP評論是國家高端智庫華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺(tái)

導(dǎo)語：進(jìn)入2026年，北極地區(qū)延續(xù)氣候升溫態(tài)勢，隨之升高的，還有圍繞北極的地緣政治熱度。據(jù)報(bào)道，美國正尋求進(jìn)入格陵蘭島南部新建3處軍事基地，并提出將其作為“美國主權(quán)領(lǐng)土”。美方還宣稱，這些基地的主要任務(wù)是監(jiān)視俄羅斯和中國在北大西洋的海上活動(dòng)，重點(diǎn)覆蓋格陵蘭、冰島與英國之間的“GIUK缺口”海域，即連接北大西洋與北冰洋航道的關(guān)鍵戰(zhàn)略水域。與此同時(shí)，隨著北極海冰消融，資源開發(fā)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值也隨之凸顯。隨著北極被更多納入大國競爭視野，中國如何在堅(jiān)持“近北極國家”定位參與北極事務(wù)的同時(shí)，避免科研、航運(yùn)和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施合作被過度安全化？

2026年5月7日，《南華早報(bào)》（South China Morning Post）刊發(fā)全版深度報(bào)道，關(guān)注北極航道開放、中美北極競爭與合作前景等議題，IPP榮譽(yù)教授梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）和IPP副研究員李品保應(yīng)邀接受采訪，并分享觀察與分析。

美國總統(tǒng)特朗普對中國進(jìn)行歷史性訪問之際，正值伊朗戰(zhàn)爭擾亂全球能源供應(yīng)、加劇經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性并給華盛頓與北京的關(guān)系帶來新的壓力。在本系列文章的最新一篇中，我們將探討競爭、相互依存和地緣政治危機(jī)如何重塑美中兩國關(guān)系，并將目光聚焦于北極這一競爭舞臺(tái)。

北極地區(qū)正在升溫，無論是在物理層面還是在地緣政治層面。

隨著北極變暖加速，海冰減少到歷史最低或接近歷史最低水平，該地區(qū)對航運(yùn)和資源開采變得更加便利——這也加劇了大國之間的競爭。

預(yù)計(jì)中美在極地地區(qū)的競爭將會(huì)加劇，但分析人士表示，“務(wù)實(shí)的”合作仍然是必要的，而且可能變得更加重要。

霍爾木茲海峽危機(jī)、也門胡塞武裝為聲援加沙而襲擊紅海航運(yùn)，甚至2021年因貨船擱淺而導(dǎo)致蘇伊士運(yùn)河暫時(shí)關(guān)閉等事件，都凸顯了北極作為潛在替代海上航道的重要性。

受氣候變化影響，冰層融化，格陵蘭周邊水域的航運(yùn)通道正在逐步開放。海水變暖也可能帶來新的礦產(chǎn)資源開發(fā)機(jī)會(huì)。圖源：BBC

然而，日益激烈的中美競爭也引發(fā)了人們的擔(dān)憂，即前蘇聯(lián)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人米哈伊爾·戈?duì)柊蛦谭蛟Q之為“和平區(qū)”（zone of peace ）的地區(qū)，可能正在成為華盛頓和北京之間戰(zhàn)略競爭的新前沿。

除了航運(yùn)之外，該地區(qū)在科學(xué)研究、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)和資源開采方面也變得更加便利，但華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究所名譽(yù)教授梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希表示，這可能會(huì)加劇競爭和不信任。

“中美在北極地區(qū)關(guān)系的未來走向很可能受到一個(gè)悖論的影響：氣候變化在物理上打開了該地區(qū)，但在政治上卻將其關(guān)閉，”她說。

北京大學(xué)深圳研究生院去年九月發(fā)表的一項(xiàng)研究預(yù)測，到2100年，北極可以支持所有主要船舶類型的全年航行，從而使不同的跨洋航線能夠處理比蘇伊士運(yùn)河或巴拿馬運(yùn)河更大比例的全球航運(yùn)交通。

北京在2018年的一份白皮書中明確了北極未來的重要性，將中國描述為該地區(qū)的“重要利益攸關(guān)方”和“近北極國家”。中國也一直在穩(wěn)步擴(kuò)大其在極地地區(qū)的治理和科學(xué)考察中的作用。

2018年1月26日，中國國務(wù)院新聞辦公室發(fā)表《中國的北極政策》白皮書，這是中國首次就北極政策發(fā)表白皮書。

同年，它與包括美國在內(nèi)的其他九個(gè)締約方合作，締結(jié)了具有里程碑意義的《防止中北冰洋不管制公海漁業(yè)協(xié)定》。

該條約是世界上第一個(gè)具有法律約束力的多邊文書，旨在防止在公海區(qū)域開始商業(yè)捕魚，也是北京在北極地區(qū)決策中擁有平等發(fā)言權(quán)的唯一國際機(jī)制。

中國還是北極理事會(huì)的觀察員，沒有投票權(quán)。自2022年俄羅斯（北極理事會(huì)的八個(gè)成員國之一）對烏克蘭發(fā)動(dòng)全面入侵以來，北極理事會(huì)一直處于停滯狀態(tài)。

3月下旬，中國在東部城市杭州主辦了漁業(yè)協(xié)定科學(xué)協(xié)調(diào)小組會(huì)議，中國政府稱此舉“提升了其在北極事務(wù)中的參與度”。

北京還希望在“極地絲綢之路”框架下開發(fā)更多航運(yùn)路線和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，這是其跨大陸“一帶一路”倡議的一部分。

馬達(dá)爾沙希表示，華盛頓會(huì)謹(jǐn)慎對待讓中國等非北極國家在地區(qū)事務(wù)中發(fā)揮更大作用的問題。

“隨著信任度的下降，科學(xué)存在可能會(huì)從安全角度來看待，”她說道，并認(rèn)為研究站、破冰船、海底測繪和數(shù)據(jù)收集也可能具有更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略意義。

她還表示，美國的擔(dān)憂包括港口、互聯(lián)互通和戰(zhàn)略準(zhǔn)入，并且美國將越來越多地從中國與俄羅斯更廣泛的戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟的角度來解讀中國在北極地區(qū)的作用。

“圍繞關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)、能源和北方基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的競爭可能會(huì)加劇，尤其是在商業(yè)項(xiàng)目與國家安全、盟國領(lǐng)土和供應(yīng)鏈韌性重疊的情況下，”馬達(dá)爾沙希說。

“隨著氣候變化提升北極的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值，這種地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)層面可能會(huì)進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大?！?/strong>

圖片：南華早報(bào)。資料來源：牛津分析公司、國家冰雪數(shù)據(jù)中心。

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院副研究員李品保表示，3月份在杭州舉行的會(huì)議表明，中美兩國在氣候監(jiān)測和公海漁業(yè)管理等不太敏感的問題上擁有“不可替代的共同利益”（irreplaceable common interests）。

但他表示，還有其他一些領(lǐng)域問題更大，例如美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普威脅要占領(lǐng)格陵蘭島，華盛頓將北極視為大國競爭新戰(zhàn)場的戰(zhàn)略，以及將中俄在北極的合作視為“威脅”。

李品保說：“中美在北極的關(guān)系正在進(jìn)入更深的水域：競爭強(qiáng)度不斷上升，但功能性合作依然保持韌性?！?/p>

“真正需要關(guān)注的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是，如果美國繼續(xù)將北極事務(wù)與更廣泛的中美戰(zhàn)略競爭緊密聯(lián)系起來，可能會(huì)阻礙一些合作機(jī)制，并逐漸縮小原本有助于建立互信的渠道?！?/p>

在杭州會(huì)議召開前幾天，美國空軍上將、北方司令部司令格雷戈里·吉洛特（Gregory Guillot）在國會(huì)聽證會(huì)上表示，美國正在與丹麥談判，以獲得在格陵蘭島的三個(gè)額外基地的使用權(quán)。

這將標(biāo)志著美國在冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后縮減軍事存在數(shù)十年來，首次在該地區(qū)進(jìn)行軍事擴(kuò)張。

特朗普以中國和俄羅斯構(gòu)成的所謂威脅為由，多次公開表示想要占領(lǐng)格陵蘭島，這促使丹麥及其一些歐洲盟友在今年早些時(shí)候向格陵蘭島派遣了軍隊(duì)和裝備，以防遭到攻擊。

4月23日，美國在華盛頓舉辦了一次會(huì)議，邀請了除俄羅斯以外的所有北極沿岸國家的高級外交代表——被稱為“北極七國”（A7）——討論在海洋中的“共同經(jīng)濟(jì)和安全利益”。

在特朗普的第一任期內(nèi)，時(shí)任國務(wù)卿邁克·蓬佩奧指責(zé)中國在北極地區(qū)有“侵略性行為模式”，而對北京意圖的懷疑一直延續(xù)到喬·拜登的總統(tǒng)任期。

2026年3月15日在挪威奧斯陸舉行的“加拿大—北歐峰會(huì)”。加拿大總理馬克·卡尼訪問挪威，并與挪威、丹麥、瑞典、芬蘭、冰島五個(gè)北歐國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)晤。會(huì)議主題主要是加強(qiáng)北極安全、防務(wù)合作等。圖源：路透社

2022年《美國北極地區(qū)國家戰(zhàn)略》（US National Strategy for the Arctic Region）和五角大樓2024年《北極戰(zhàn)略》（Arctic Strategy）都強(qiáng)調(diào)了華盛頓對中國在該地區(qū)日益增長的影響力的疑慮，以及加強(qiáng)在該地區(qū)存在以保護(hù)國家安全的必要性。

今年早些時(shí)候，北約歐洲最高指揮官阿萊克西斯·格林克維奇（Alexus Grynkewich）也曾警告說，跨大西洋聯(lián)盟應(yīng)該“注意”俄羅斯和中國在北極地區(qū)日益密切的合作。

李警告說，如果美國持續(xù)以“過度安全化”的視角來看待中國的科學(xué)活動(dòng)或中俄合作，可能會(huì)“加劇安全困境，甚至增加摩擦的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。

他還補(bǔ)充說，華盛頓及其盟友為阻止中國參與北極通信和港口開發(fā)而采取的措施，可能會(huì)“使商業(yè)競爭帶上更濃厚的意識(shí)形態(tài)色彩”。

李還表示，中國與北極國家（除美國和俄羅斯外，還包括加拿大、丹麥、冰島、挪威、瑞典和芬蘭）在北極航運(yùn)路線的法律適用性和資源開發(fā)的環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等規(guī)則制定問題上存在不同看法。

他說：“諸如‘公?！c‘內(nèi)水’之類的分類爭議仍然是未來爭論的焦點(diǎn)。”

但他表示，在冷戰(zhàn)高峰時(shí)期，美國和蘇聯(lián)曾就該地區(qū)的環(huán)境保護(hù)問題進(jìn)行過討論，并補(bǔ)充說，“今天的中國和美國在北極地區(qū)應(yīng)該有更廣泛的合作空間”。

“作為世界兩大經(jīng)濟(jì)體和溫室氣體排放大國，中美兩國在北極氣候監(jiān)測和碳循環(huán)研究方面擁有超越地緣政治的共同利益?！?/p>

他還指出，在海上安全以及漁業(yè)和生態(tài)系統(tǒng)保護(hù)等其他領(lǐng)域，存在著“相當(dāng)大的”合作空間。

在北冰洋進(jìn)行科學(xué)考察的“雪龍2”號。圖源：新華社

上海國際問題研究院國際戰(zhàn)略與安全研究所所長趙隆認(rèn)為，中美兩國在北極問題上可能存在更多合作空間，而非競爭空間。

“我認(rèn)為中國和美國在北極安全問題上不存在任何直接的利益分歧，”他說。

趙隆還表示，特朗普對氣候變化缺乏關(guān)注以及削減科研經(jīng)費(fèi)可能會(huì)促使美國科學(xué)家尋求與其他國家（包括中國）在北極研究方面更緊密合作的方式。

他還表示，特朗普對北極能源和資源開發(fā)的強(qiáng)烈熱情可能會(huì)為美國與中國的合作創(chuàng)造“新的增長點(diǎn)”，因?yàn)橹袊鴮Χ嘣剂线M(jìn)口的需求可能會(huì)繼續(xù)增長。

趙隆補(bǔ)充說，結(jié)束烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭可能為中國與北歐國家在北極航運(yùn)路線上更緊密的合作鋪平道路。

他還表示，必須消除“關(guān)于中國的錯(cuò)誤敘述和誤解”，包括有關(guān)中國正在擴(kuò)大其在該地區(qū)的軍事存在、試圖與俄羅斯共同主導(dǎo)北極治理或利用其他國家之間的分歧的說法。

“我們應(yīng)該努力使北極成為大國之間建設(shè)性接觸和互動(dòng)的前沿陣地，而不是讓它淪為大國對抗的前線，”他補(bǔ)充道。

不過，趙隆表示，“北極特殊論”的時(shí)代——即認(rèn)為環(huán)境至關(guān)重要的極地地區(qū)是一個(gè)獨(dú)特的地方，在很大程度上不受外界安全緊張局勢的影響——已經(jīng)結(jié)束，競爭與合作將并行發(fā)展。

2025年3月28日，美國副總統(tǒng)萬斯和夫人參觀位于格陵蘭島的美國軍事基地皮圖菲克太空基地。圖源：AP

李品保表示，北極地區(qū)未來人口密度增加“幾乎不可避免”，中國或許有機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)一步明確其在北極地區(qū)的作用。

他說： “中國應(yīng)繼續(xù)保持戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)，深化科學(xué)合作，遵守國際法，并在自身能力范圍內(nèi)提供公共產(chǎn)品。”

他還呼吁在北極地區(qū)的中國企業(yè)更加重視環(huán)境、社會(huì)和治理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及透明度，并加強(qiáng)與土著社區(qū)的互動(dòng)。

馬達(dá)爾沙希還表示，氣候變化可能為中美之間開展有限但有意義的合作創(chuàng)造一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的理由。

她表示：“中國在北極理事會(huì)的觀察員地位以及現(xiàn)有的多邊框架表明，即使在競爭激烈的環(huán)境中，有選擇的合作仍然是可能的，也是必要的。”

原文題為“Will warming Arctic trigger further chill in US-China relations or bring them closer?”，作者為Orange Wang，《南華早報(bào)》中國高級記者

*以下為原英文報(bào)道，供讀者對照參考（請上下滑動(dòng)查看）。

US President Donald Trump’s landmark visit to China comes as the Iran war disrupts global energy supplies, fuels economic uncertainty and adds fresh strain to Washington-Beijing ties. In the first part of a series examining how rivalry, interdependence and geopolitical crises are reshaping the relationship between the two powers, we look at the Arctic as an arena for competition.

The Arctic is heating up, both physically and in terms of geopolitics.

As Arctic warming accelerates and sea ice declines to record or near-record lows, the region is becoming more accessible for shipping and resource extraction – something that also fuels great power rivalry.

The competition between China and the United States in the polar region is expected to intensify, but analysts said “functional” cooperation would still be necessary and may yet prove more important.

Events such as the Strait of Hormuz crisis, attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Red Sea shipping in solidarity with Gaza and even the temporary closure of the Suez Canal in 2021, when a cargo ship became stuck, have highlighted the importance of the Arctic as a potential alternative sea lane.

However, the increasingly heated China-US rivalry has also raised concerns that an area once described by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as a “zone of peace” may be becoming a new frontier for the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

Apart from shipping, the region is also becoming more accessible for scientific research, infrastructure development and resource extraction, but this may fuel further competition and mistrust, according to Mehri Madarshahi, an honorary professor at the South China University of Technology’s Institute of Public Policy.

“The future trajectory of China-US relations in the Arctic is likely to be shaped by a paradox: climate change is opening the region physically while closing it politically,” she said.

A study published last September by Peking University’s Shenzhen Graduate School predicted that by 2100 the Arctic could support year-round navigation for all major vessel types, allowing different routes across the ocean to handle a greater portion of global shipping traffic than the Suez or Panama canals.

Beijing identified the future importance of the Arctic in a 2018 white paper that described China as an “important stakeholder” in the region and a “near-Arctic state”. It has also been steadily expanding its role in governance and scientific expeditions in polar regions.

The same year it worked with nine other parties, including the US, to conclude the landmark Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.

The pact is the world’s first legally binding multilateral instrument to prevent commercial fishing starting in a high-seas area and is also the only international mechanism in the Arctic where Beijing has an equal say in decision-making.

The country is also an observer with no voting rights in the Arctic Council, which has stalled since Russia – one of its eight members – launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In late March, China hosted a meeting of the fisheries pact’s scientific coordinating group in the eastern city of Hangzhou, a move the government described as “elevating its engagement in Arctic affairs”.

Beijing also hopes to develop more shipping routes and infrastructure under the Polar Silk Road, a part of its transcontinental Belt and Road Initiative.

Madarshahi said Washington would be wary about giving non-Arctic states such as China a greater role in regional affairs.

“As trust declines, scientific presence may be viewed through a security lens,” she said, arguing that research stations, icebreakers, seabed mapping and data collection could also have a wider strategic significance.

She also said that US concerns included ports, connectivity and strategic access and that it would increasingly interpret China’s Arctic role through its broader strategic alignment with Russia.

“Rivalry could sharpen around critical minerals, energy and northern infrastructure, especially where commercial projects overlap with national security, allied territory and supply-chain resilience,” Madarshahi said.

“This geoeconomic dimension is likely to expand as climate change increases the Arctic’s strategic value.”

The March meeting in Hangzhou showed China and the US shared “irreplaceable common interests” on less sensitive issues such as climate monitoring and high-seas fisheries management, according to Li Pinbao, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Public Policy.

But he said there were other areas that were more problematic, citing US President Donald Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, Washington’s strategy of framing the Arctic as a new arena for great-power competition and its view of China-Russia cooperation there as a “threat”.

Li said: “China-US relations in the Arctic are entering deeper waters: the intensity of competition is rising but functional cooperation remains resilient.

“The real risk to watch is that if the United States continues to hard-link Arctic affairs with the broader China-US strategic competition, it could stall some cooperative mechanisms and gradually narrow the channels that could otherwise help build mutual trust.”

Days before the meeting in Hangzhou, Gregory Guillot, a US Air Force general and head of Northern Command, told a congressional hearing that the country was negotiating with Denmark for access to three additional bases in Greenland.

That would mark the first US military expansion there in decades after scaling back its military presence at the end of the Cold War.Citing alleged threats posed by China and Russia, Trump has repeatedly broadcast his desire to take over Greenland, prompting Denmark and some of its European allies to send troops and equipment there earlier in the year in case of attack.

The US on April 23 hosted a gathering in Washington of senior diplomatic representatives from all Arctic littoral states excluding Russia – dubbed the Arctic Seven (A7) – to discuss “shared economic and security interests” in the ocean.

During Trump’s first term of office, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo accused China of a “pattern of aggressive behaviour” in the Arctic, and the suspicion of Beijing’s intentions continued into Joe Biden’s presidency.

The 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the Pentagon’s 2024 Arctic Strategy both highlighted Washington’s suspicions about China’s growing presence in the region and the need for an enhanced presence to protect national security.

Nato’s top European commander Alexus Grynkewich also warned earlier this year that the transatlantic alliance should “be mindful of” Russia and China increasingly working together in the Arctic region.

Li warned that if the US were to persistently frame Chinese scientific activities or China-Russian cooperation through an “overly securitised” lens, that could “intensify security dilemmas and even raise the risk of friction”.

He added that Washington and its allies’ efforts to counter Chinese participation in Arctic communications and port development could risk “infusing commercial competition with greater ideological overtones”.

Li also said that China and the Arctic states – which apart from the US and Russia also include Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland – had different views on rule-setting issues such as legal applicability for Arctic shipping routes and environmental standards for resource development.

“Disputes over classifications such as ‘high seas’ versus ‘internal waters’ remain a focal point of future contestation,” he said.

But he said the US and Soviet Union had been able to discuss environmental protection for the region at the height of the Cold War, adding “today’s China and the US should have even broader room for cooperation in the Arctic”.

“As the world’s two largest economies and major greenhouse gas emitters, China and the US share common interests in Arctic climate monitoring and carbon cycle research that transcend geopolitics.”

He also pointed out the “considerable” scope for cooperation on maritime safety along with other areas such as fisheries and protecting the ecosystem.

China and the US are likely to find more room for cooperation than competition on Arctic issues, according to Zhao Long, the director of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

“I don’t think there are any direct differences of interest … between China and the US on Arctic security issues,” he said.

Zhao also said Trump’s lack of concern over climate change and cuts to scientific funding might prompt US scientists to look for ways to work more closely with other countries, including China, on Arctic research.

He also said Trump’s strong enthusiasm for Arctic energy and resource development could create a “new growth point” for US cooperation with China, whose demand for diversified fuel imports may continue to grow.

Zhao added that an end to the war in Ukraine could open the way for closer cooperation between China and Nordic countries on Arctic shipping routes.

He also said it was important to dispel “false narratives and misconceptions about China”, including claims that it was expanding its military presence in the region, trying to dominate Arctic governance with Russia or exploit divisions among other countries.

“[We should] strive to make the Arctic a frontier for constructive engagement and interaction between major powers, not let it descend into a frontline of great-power confrontation,” he added.

Still, Zhao said the age of “Arctic exceptionalism” – the idea that the environmentally crucial polar region is a unique place that is largely immune to security tensions in the outside world – was over, and competition and cooperation would now evolve in parallel.

Li said that it was “almost inevitable” that the Arctic would become increasingly crowded in the future and there may be opportunities for China to further define its role there.

“[China] should continue to maintain strategic focus, deepen scientific engagement, act in accordance with international law and provide public goods where its capacity allows,” he said.

He also called for Chinese enterprises in the Arctic to place greater emphasis on environmental, social and governance standards and transparency, as well as engaging with indigenous communities.

Madarshahi also said climate change could create a strong case for limited but meaningful cooperation between China and the US.

“China’s observer status in the Arctic Council and existing multilateral frameworks show that even in a competitive environment, selective cooperation remains both possible and necessary,” she said.

原報(bào)道于5月7日刊登于《南華早報(bào)》官網(wǎng)，原標(biāo)題為“Will warming Arctic trigger further chill in US-China relations or bring them closer?”。小標(biāo)題為編輯自擬，原報(bào)道中相關(guān)背景內(nèi)容有所調(diào)整補(bǔ)充。

受訪人

梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國教科文組織下屬國際創(chuàng)意與可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會(huì)成員

李品保

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院 副研究員

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