Mehri Madarshahi｜能源安全、中美地緣政治競爭與氣候承諾的弱化

IPP評論是國家高端智庫華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺

導語：隨著伊朗戰爭引發的石油危機導致眾多國家和地區的能源安全受到威脅，全球正愈發清晰地意識到：能源問題早已深深嵌入地緣政治邏輯之中。

IPP榮譽教授梅赫里·馬達爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）發文指出，全球能源轉型正日益受到地緣政治競爭和能源安全擔憂的制約。雖然《巴黎協定》為去碳化創造了動力，但烏克蘭、波斯灣和霍爾木茲海峽的戰事與動蕩，重新喚起了化石燃料的戰略重要性。隨著各國政府將確保供應安全和經濟穩定列為優先事項，氣候方面的承諾在實際操作中遭到了削弱。

文章將這一轉變與美國與中國的競爭聯系起來，指出在能源控制領域，化石燃料的主導地位與可再生能源的領導地位構成了兩種相互競爭的權力來源。歐洲的能源脆弱性表明，氣候方面的雄心壯志有可能被重新導向對化石燃料的依賴。文章最后警告稱，如果這一過渡過程淪為大國角力的又一舞臺，那么它很可能會遭到拖延和扭曲。

Energy Security, U.S.–China Geopolitical Rivalry, and the Erosion of Climate Commitments

能源安全、中美地緣政治競爭與氣候承諾的弱化

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·馬達爾沙希）

IPP榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

Phil Noble / 路透社

《巴黎協定》標志著全球在氣候變化問題上罕見地形成了一次共識。幾乎所有國家，包括美國和中國，首次共同承諾加入一個旨在減少溫室氣體排放、限制全球變暖的框架之中。該協定確立了一個共同方向，即逐步向低碳經濟轉型，推進減排目標和凈零目標，并維持持續性的多邊合作。

The Paris Agreement marked a rare moment of global alignment on climate change. For the first time, nearly all states, including the United States and China committed to a common framework aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and limiting global warming. The agreement established a shared direction focus on the gradual transition toward low-carbon economies, emissions reductions, net-zero targets, and sustained multilateral cooperation.

在隨后的幾年里，這一承諾又得到一系列趨同趨勢的強化。各國政府相繼出臺更加雄心勃勃的氣候政策，金融市場開始將環境標準納入投資決策，可再生能源在多個地區快速部署。圍繞全球能源體系可以逐步轉型、2020年至2030年將是加速這一轉型的決定性十年，各方逐漸形成了廣泛共識。

In the years that followed, this commitment was reinforced by a series of converging developments. Governments adopted increasingly ambitious climate policies, financial markets began integrating environmental criteria into investment decisions, and renewable energy expanded rapidly across multiple regions. A broad consensus emerged around the idea that the global energy system could be progressively transformed, and that the decade between 2020 and 2030 would be decisive in accelerating this transition.

然而，這一勢頭后來被證明比最初設想的更加脆弱。自2022年以來，一系列地緣政治沖擊打斷了《巴黎協定》后形成的轉型軌跡。大規模沖突的回歸，尤其是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之后，使能源安全重新成為政策制定者關注的核心問題。霍爾木茲海峽等關鍵能源通道的不穩定局勢進一步強化了這一轉向；相關緊張形勢凸顯出全球石油供應的脆弱性。

Yet this momentum has proven more fragile than initially assumed. Since 2022, a series of geopolitical shocks has disrupted the trajectory set in motion after Paris. The return of large-scale conflict, most notably following theRussian invasion of Ukraine, reintroduced energy security as a central concern for policymakers. This shift was further reinforced by instability in key energy corridors, including the Strait of Hormuz, where tensions have underscored the vulnerability of global oil supply.

這些變化已經產生了切實后果。各國政府推遲或修訂了脫碳時間表，擴大了對化石燃料基礎設施的投資，并將供應安全置于長期氣候目標之上。因此，盡管《巴黎協定》框架下的正式承諾依然存在，但其對政策和市場行為的實際影響力已經減弱。

These developments have had tangible consequences. Governments have delayed or revised decarbonization timelines, expanded investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, and prioritized supply security over long-term climate objectives.Thus, while the formal commitments of the Paris framework remain in place, their practical influence on policy and market behavior have weakened.

今天正在出現的，并不是“后巴黎時代”能源轉型的簡單延續，而是一幅更加復雜、更加碎片化的圖景。氣候目標仍然是一個重要參照，但它們越來越多地需要與地緣政治競爭、經濟穩定和能源安全等考量相互競爭，并且往往被置于這些考量之下。全球能源轉型曾被視為一項協調一致的共同努力，如今卻正在戰略競爭和系統性緊張的條件下展開。

Today, what is emerging is not a straightforward continuation of the post-Paris transition, but a more complex and fragmented landscape. Climate goals persist as a reference point, yet they increasingly compete with and are often subordinated to, considerations of geopolitical rivalry, economic stability, and energy security. The global energy transition, once framed as a coordinated effort, is now unfolding under conditions of strategic competition and systemic tension.

4月17日，俄羅斯克拉斯諾達爾邊疆區圖阿普謝發生烏克蘭襲擊事件，導致石油泄漏到黑海。圖源：路透社

從氣候行動勢頭到戰略性逆轉

From Climate Momentum to Strategic Reversal

然而，“后巴黎時代”轉型軌跡的中斷并不是在某一個瞬間突然發生的，而是在地緣政治沖擊觸發之下，各項優先事項迅速重新排序的結果。原本，人們期待2020年至2030年這十年將以加速脫碳為主要特征；但這種期待正越來越多地讓位于一種更加復雜的現實：能源安全、經濟穩定和戰略競爭開始發揮決定性作用。

The disruption of the post-Paris trajectory did not,however, occur in a single moment, but through a rapid reordering of priorities triggered by geopolitical shocks. The expectation that the 2020–2030 decade would be defined by accelerated decarbonization has increasingly given way to a more complex reality in which energy security, economic stability, and strategic competition play a determining role.

俄烏沖突成為一個關鍵轉折點。它暴露出能源供應體系的脆弱性，尤其是在歐洲，迫使各國政府重新評估能源轉型的速度與結構。重新啟用煤炭、擴建液化天然氣基礎設施、推動供應來源多元化等應急措施，都反映出政策重心正在緊急轉向確保眼前的能源需求。

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a critical inflection point. By exposing the vulnerability of energy supply systems-particularly in Europe-it forced governments to reassess the pace and structure of the energy transition. Emergency measures, including the reactivation of coal, the expansion of liquefied natural gas infrastructure, and the diversification of supply sources, reflected an urgent shift toward securing immediate energy needs.

這種重新校準并不局限于歐洲。它標志著政策制定層面出現了更廣泛的轉變：長期氣候目標開始被置于短期安全與韌性需求之下加以權衡。市場也同步作出反應，重新加大對化石燃料生產和基礎設施的投資，從而進一步強化了這一趨勢。

This recalibration was not limited to Europe. It signaled a broader transformation in policymaking, where long-term climate objectives began to be weighed against short-term imperatives of security and resilience. Markets responded in parallel, with renewed investment in fossil fuel production and infrastructure, further reinforcing this trend.

近來，霍爾木茲海峽等關鍵能源通道周邊的不穩定局勢進一步放大了這些壓力。石油市場的波動，以及維持供應不中斷所具有的戰略重要性，使化石燃料在各國決策中的地位持續上升。

More recently, instability surrounding critical energy corridors such as theStrait of Hormuz has amplified these pressures. Volatility in oil markets and the strategic importance of maintaining uninterrupted supply have continued to elevate the role of fossil fuels in national decision-making.

然而必須強調的是，盡管氣候承諾在形式上依然存在，其實際操作意義已經明顯下降。正在出現的并不是既有進程的延續，而是一種優先事項的重新排序：能源安全正越來越多地壓倒脫碳目標。

What must be emphasized, however, is that while climate commitments remain formally in place, their operational significance has been markedly reduced. What is emerging is not continuity, but a reordering of priorities in which energy security increasingly overrides decarbonization goals.

綜合來看，這些發展指向的不是暫時偏離，而是一場結構性轉變。在一個日益碎片化的國際體系中，能源轉型正在被地緣政治現實重新塑造，并在某些情況下受到限制。

Taken together, these developments point to a structural shift rather than a temporary deviation. This energy transition is being reshaped and in some cases constrained, by the geopolitical realities of an increasingly fragmented international system.

在中東局勢導致能源緊張的背景下，歐盟委員會22日公布名為 “加速歐盟” 的行動方案，旨在減輕能源價格飆升對歐洲家庭和企業造成的沖擊，推動歐盟邁向 “能源獨立”。圖源：Getty Images

化石燃料“權力”的延續與擴張

The Persistence and Expansion of Fossil Fuel Power

與關于能源轉型有序推進的主流敘事相反，化石燃料不僅仍然處于全球能源結構的中心位置，而且深深嵌入主要大國的戰略計算之中。石油和天然氣繼續作為地緣政治影響力的工具發揮作用，既塑造著國際關系的運行方式，也影響著全球市場的結構。

Contrary to prevailing narratives of an orderly energy transition, fossil fuels remain not only central to the global energy mix but also deeply embedded in the strategic calculations of major powers. Oil and gas continue to function as instruments of geopolitical influence, shaping both the conduct of international relations and the structure of global markets.

近期發展表明，化石燃料權力的延續并不只是慣性或政策調整遲緩的結果。相反，它反映出一種更具“主動性”的模式：對能源資源和供應通道的控制，已經構成戰略行為的核心要素。在這一背景下，化石燃料并不是即將被逐步淘汰的普通商品，而是需要被管理、被保障，并在可能情況下被加以利用的戰略資產。

Recent developments suggest that this persistence is not merely the result of inertia or slow policy adaptation. Rather, it reflects a more deliberate pattern in which control over energy resources and supply routes constitutes a core element of strategic behavior. In this context, fossil fuels are not simply commodities to be phased out, but assets to be managed, secured, and, where possible, leveraged.

不同年份全球石油總需求月度走勢，單位為百萬桶/日。圖源：IEA

委內瑞拉和波斯灣等地區的動態變化，正體現了這一模式。主要產油國的政治和經濟變化，推動其能源部門重新組織，使外部力量得以在新的條件下重新接觸相關儲備，并促使這些資源重新融入全球市場。與此同時，霍爾木茲海峽等關鍵運輸節點周邊緊張局勢加劇，也凸顯出控制能源生產本身之外，控制能源流動同樣重要。綜合來看，這些發展指向一種雙重戰略：在政治上相互靠近的背景下擴大供應，在敵對關系中限制或擾亂供應。

The evolving dynamics in regions such as Venezuela and the Persian Gulf illustrate this pattern. Political and economic shifts in major oil-producing states have facilitated the reorganization of their energy sectors, enabling renewed access to reserves and their reintegration into global markets under altered conditions. At the same time, heightened tensions around critical transit points such as the Strait of Hormuz underscore the importance of controlling not only production, but also the flow of energy. Together, these developments point to a dual strategy: the expansion of supply in politically aligned contexts, and the restriction or disruption of supply in adversarial ones.

航運數據顯示，委內瑞拉3月石油日出口量突破100萬桶大關。圖源：路透社

這種雙重性表明，在更廣泛的權力結構中，石油發揮著戰略杠桿的作用。它不僅使國家能夠保障自身能源需求，也使其能夠影響全球定價、市場穩定，以及其他行為體開展活動時所處的經濟條件。從這個意義上說，對化石燃料體系的管理，已經與地緣政治權力的行使密不可分。

This duality suggests that oil functions as a strategic lever within a broader architecture of power. It enables states not only to secure their own energy needs but also to influence global pricing, market stability, and the economic conditions under which other actors operate. In this sense, the management of fossil fuel systems becomes inseparable from the exercise of geopolitical power.

重要的是，這一動態必須放在大國競爭加劇的背景下理解，尤其是中美競爭不斷加劇的背景下。獲取能源資源、控制供應鏈，正日益同更廣泛的戰略關切交織在一起，其中包括技術領導權、工業能力和全球影響力。因此，影響主要產油地區的行動，其意義已經超出眼前的資源考量，并會塑造競爭對手追求其經濟和政治目標時所處的戰略環境。

Importantly, this dynamic must be understood within the coext of intensifying great-power competition, particularly between the United States and China. Access to energy resources and control over supply chains are increasingly intertwined with broader strategic concerns, including technological leadership, industrial capacity, and global influence. Actions affecting major oil-producing regions therefore have implications that extend beyond immediate resource considerations, shaping the strategic environment in which rivals pursue their economic and political objectives.

其結果是一種結構性悖論：盡管全球話語仍在強調脫碳，但能源安全與大國競爭的地緣政治邏輯，卻進一步強化了化石燃料的中心地位，并使其被重新工具化——它們不再只是能源來源，也成為在日益激烈競爭的國際體系中進行戰略布局的工具。

The result is a structural paradox. While global discourse continues to emphasize decarbonization, the geopolitical logic of energy security and competition reinforces the centrality of fossil fuels, re-instrumentalizing it, not only as sources of energy, but as tools of strategic positioning in an increasingly contested international system.

中東戰事導致霍爾木茲海峽航運阻斷，嚴重影響波斯灣的石油運輸，亞洲與歐洲國家紛紛轉向美國尋找替代貨源。圖源：Getty Images

能源轉型，還是能源圍困？

Energy Transition or Energy Siege?

如果說能源安全已經成為氣候行動倒退的一個驅動因素，那么更深層的問題在于，為什么這種模式會如此持久，并且在政治上如此難以逆轉。答案并不僅僅在于市場慣性或制度乏力，而在于一場日益塑造能源秩序本身的地緣政治斗爭。乍看之下，這似乎是短期供應需求與長期氣候目標之間的沖突；但實際上，它嵌入了一場更廣泛的競爭之中，關乎權力、戰略杠桿，以及對全球能源體系的控制。

If energy security has become a driver of climate backsliding, the deeper question is why this pattern has become so persistent and so politically difficult to reverse. The answer lies not only in market inertia or institutional weakness, but in the geopolitical struggle increasingly shaping the energy order itself. What appears at first glance to be a clash between short-term supply needs and long-term climate goals is, in reality, embedded in a broader contest over power, strategic leverage, and the control of global energy systems.

正因如此，我們不能簡單地將當下理解為一個不同國家各自追求不同發展路徑的時期。問題不僅僅在于，中國和美國正在沿著不同的能源模式前進，而這些模式原則上可以并行共存。更深層的現實是，這些模式正在發生碰撞。

This is why the present moment cannot be understood simply as a period in which different states are pursuing different developmental pathways. The issue is not merely that China and the United States are advancing through distinct energy models that might, in principle, coexist side by side. The deeper reality is that these models are colliding.

中國在可再生能源、電池、電動汽車和清潔能源制造領域的崛起，并不只是一個產業故事，更是一個地緣政治故事。它預示著一種未來的出現：戰略影響力可能不再主要取決于對傳統化石資源的控制，而越來越取決于在電氣化技術、供應鏈和基礎設施中的主導地位。這一轉變將對全球權力格局產生深遠影響。

China’s rise in renewables, batteries, electric vehicles, and clean-energy manufacturing is not only an industrial story; it is a geopolitical one. It suggests the emergence of a future in which strategic influence may depend less on traditional control of fossil resources and more on dominance in the technologies, supply chains, and infrastructures of electrification. That shift has profound implications for global power.

新疆吐魯番市鄯善縣1GW“光熱+光伏”一體化項目。圖源：新華社

正是這一轉變，進一步凸顯了當今能源安全問題核心處的矛盾。對美國而言，能源長期以來不僅關乎繁榮，也與戰略準則、全球投射能力和體系性影響力緊密相連。自21世紀初以來，美國安全思維反復將對主要能源生產地區、運輸通道和海上咽喉要道的進入與影響，視為其全球主導地位的重要組成部分。在這一框架下，化石能源并不只是商品，而是一種杠桿：它可以被保護、被制裁、被改道、被扣留，也可以被用來強化聯盟和依賴關系。隨著“轉型”話語興起，這一邏輯并未消失。恰恰相反，它仍在塑造美國權力更深層的戰略反射。

It is precisely this shift that sharpens the contradiction at the heart of energy security today. For the United States, energy has long been tied not only to prosperity, but to strategic doctrine, global reach, and systemic influence. Since the early 2000s, American security thinking has repeatedly treated access to and influence over major energy-producing regions, transport corridors, and maritime chokepoints as integral to its global primacy. In that framework, fossil energy is not merely a commodity, it is a source of leverage: something that can be protected, sanctioned, rerouted, withheld, or used to reinforce alliances and dependencies. This logic has not disappeared with the language of transition. On the contrary, it continues to shape the deeper strategic reflexes of U.S. power.

也正因如此，這場沖突遠比單純圍繞能源選擇的分歧更加嚴重。一個堅定走向可再生能源、電氣化和更加分布式生產體系的世界，不僅會改變排放軌跡，也可能削弱美國長期依賴的化石燃料架構在地緣政治中的中心地位。它將把競爭場域轉向中國已經取得顯著優勢的領域。從這一角度看，問題便不再只是環境問題。能源轉型本身成為一個戰略問題。氣候科學并不一定會被直接、統一地否認；相反，每當其政策含義可能加速一種不利于華盛頓的權力再分配時，它就會被擱置到一旁。

That is why the conflict is more serious than a simple disagreement over energy choices. A world moving decisively toward renewable energy, electrification, and more distributed systems of production would not only alter emissions trajectories; it could also reduce the geopolitical centrality of the fossil-fuel architecture on which American power has long relied. It would shift the terrain of competition toward sectors in which China has already gained significant advantage. Seen from that perspective, the issue is no longer merely environmental. The transition itself becomes a strategic problem. Climate science is not necessarily denied in a direct or uniform way; rather, it is displaced whenever its implications threaten to accelerate a redistribution of power unfavorable to Washington.

這有助于解釋，為什么即便面對氣候危險的壓倒性證據，對能源安全的追求仍常常會強化對化石燃料的依賴。問題并不只是各國政府行動遲緩、前后不一或言行不符，而是化石能源仍然提供著可再生能源體系尚未完全復制的戰略效用。石油和天然氣依然同航運通道、軍事保護、地區影響、制裁機制、定價權和脅迫外交緊密相連。它們深深嵌入舊有的地緣政治語法之中。可再生能源或許承諾了更高的可持續性，但它并不會自動提供同樣一套由咽喉要道和控制權構成的權力架構。對于習慣于以控制、稀缺和杠桿來思考問題的國家而言，這一點極其重要。

This helps explain why the pursuit of energy security so often reinforces fossil dependence even in the face of overwhelming evidence about climate danger. It is not simply that governments are slow, inconsistent, or hypocritical. It is that fossil energy still offers forms of strategic utility that renewable systems do not yet fully replicate. Oil and gas remain tied to shipping lanes, military protection, territorial influence, sanctions regimes, pricing power, and coercive diplomacy. They are deeply embedded in the older grammar of geopolitics. Renewables may promise greater sustainability, but they do not automatically provide the same architecture of chokepoints and command. For states accustomed to thinking in terms of control, scarcity, and leverage, this matters enormously.

烏克蘭戰爭將這一矛盾充分暴露出來。一場最初表現為軍事和領土層面的沖突，很快揭示出能源在地緣政治秩序中的持久中心地位。歐洲與俄羅斯天然氣脫鉤，確實加快了尋找替代方案的步伐，也強化了擴大可再生能源的政治理由。但與此同時，它也加深了歐洲在短期內對替代性化石能源供應的依賴，尤其是對液化天然氣、應急合同以及安全獲取能源資源的激烈競爭的依賴。從這個意義上說，烏克蘭戰爭并不只是擾亂了舊有能源秩序；它重新激活了這一秩序最深層的邏輯。供應安全再次壓倒了氣候政策的一致性，能源轉型的政治議程也在戰略緊迫性的壓力下被迫后退。

The war in Ukraine brought this contradiction into full view. What began as a military and territorial conflict quickly exposed the enduring centrality of energy to geopolitical order. Europe’s rupture with Russian gas did accelerate the search for alternatives and strengthen the political case for renewable expansion. But it also deepened the short-term reliance on alternative fossil supplies, especially liquefied natural gas, emergency contracts, and intensified competition for secure access. In this sense, the Ukraine war did not simply disrupt the old energy order; it reactivated its deepest logic. Supply security once again overrode climate coherence, and the politics of transition were pushed back under the pressure of strategic urgency.

懸掛俄羅斯國旗的油輪“阿納托利·科洛德金”號停靠在古巴馬坦薩斯的一處石油碼頭。圖源：美聯社。

同樣的邏輯并不止于歐洲。委內瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗以及霍爾木茲海峽，并不是混亂全球圖景中彼此割裂的事件。它們都是一張更大棋盤上的組成部分。在這張棋盤上，對化石資源及其運輸通道的控制仍然至關重要，因為關鍵競爭對手，尤其是中國，依然依賴這些資源和通道。

The same logic extends beyond Europe. Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz are not disconnected episodes in a chaotic global landscape. They are parts of a wider chessboard in which control over fossil resources and routes continues to matter because key rivals, especially China, still depend on them.

中國或許正在可再生能源領域快速推進，但它并未擺脫化石能源層面的脆弱性。中國經濟仍然需要大量進口石油和天然氣，其中相當一部分要經過存在爭議的空間，或來自政治風險較高的產油國。這就為一種戰略打開了空間：對不可再生能源來源和運輸通道的主導，不僅服務于傳統能源安全目標，也服務于更廣泛的目標，即限制中國的戰略回旋余地。

China may be advancing rapidly in renewables, but it has not escaped fossil vulnerability. Its economy still requires substantial imported oil and gas, much of it moving through contested spaces or politically exposed producers. This creates an opening for a strategy in which dominance over non-renewable energy sources and transport corridors serves not only traditional energy security goals, but the broader objective of constraining China’s room for maneuver.

正因如此，當前能源秩序不能被描述為舊模式與新模式之間的中性共存。它正越來越成為一個對抗場域。一邊是轉型邏輯，中國試圖在下一輪能源時代的基礎設施中獲取優勢；另一邊則是一種仍然從化石能源控制、海上監督、地區壓力點以及既有國際體系維護中汲取力量的戰略反射。在這一國際體系中，能源依賴仍然可以被轉化為地緣政治杠桿。二者并不是在和平地并行展開，而是在圍繞未來的規則和條件展開競爭。

This is why the current energy order cannot be described as a neutral coexistence between an old model and a new one. It is increasingly a field of confrontation. On one side stands the logic of transition, with China seeking advantage in the infrastructure of the next energy era. On the other stands a strategic reflex that continues to draw power from fossil control, maritime oversight, regional pressure points, and the preservation of an international system in which energy dependence can still be converted into geopolitical leverage. The two are not peacefully unfolding in parallel. They are competing over the terms of the future.

在這場對抗中，歐洲處于一種不安的位置。它既是能源不安全的受害者，有時又在無意中參與了化石燃料—安全秩序的再生產。失去俄羅斯能源供應，戲劇性地暴露出歐洲對可靠能源的強烈需求。這使歐洲在努力把自身塑造為全球氣候領導者的同時，更容易受到外部沖擊影響，也更依賴替代性的化石燃料安排。歐洲或許使用的是綠色轉型的話語，但其在能源短缺和價格波動面前的結構性脆弱，仍不斷將其拉回眼前供應安全的緊迫要求之中。這樣一來，它反而強化了這樣一種地緣政治環境：可再生能源雄心被置于化石燃料必要性之下。

Europe occupies an uneasy place within this confrontation. It is at once a victim of energy insecurity and, at times, an inadvertent participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security order. Its thirst for reliable energy, exposed dramatically by the loss of Russian supply. This has made it more vulnerable to external shocks and more dependent on alternative fossil arrangements precisely at the moment when it seeks to present itself as a global climate leader. Europe may speak the language of green transformation, but its structural exposure to energy scarcity and price volatility continues to pull it back toward the imperatives of immediate supply. In doing so, it reinforces the very geopolitical environment in which renewable ambition is subordinated to fossil necessity.

其結果，是一種高度不穩定的全球狀態。氣候變化要求加速脫碳，但圍繞能源展開的競爭，卻正在推動主要大國和脆弱地區采取維持化石燃料重要性的策略。這是一場地緣政治競爭，在其中，對能源的控制仍然與爭奪戰略主導權密不可分。

The result is a deeply unstable global condition. Climate change demands accelerated decarbonization, yet the rivalry surrounding energy is pushing major powers and vulnerable regions toward strategies that preserve fossil relevance: a geopolitical contest in which control over energy remains inseparable from the struggle for strategic dominance.

那么，真正的危險并不只是氣候行動停滯不前，而是氣候行動已經進入一個權力劇場：能源轉型正越來越多地被地緣政治競爭所塑造、延宕和扭曲。

The real danger, then, is not just climate inaction. It is that climate action has entered a theater of power in which energy transition is increasingly shaped, delayed, and distorted by geopolitical competition.

波斯灣戰事已經引發歐洲地圖的能源危機。圖源：AI生成圖片

歐洲、烏克蘭、霍爾木茲與化石燃料—安全棋盤

Europe, Ukraine, Hormuz, and the Fossil-Security Chessboard

如果說上一部分揭示了能源轉型與地緣政治競爭之間的戰略碰撞，那么下一步就需要觀察這種碰撞如何在具體危機場域中展開。這一矛盾已經不再抽象。它體現在烏克蘭戰爭之中，體現在委內瑞拉和伊拉克戰略重要性的重新上升之中，體現在圍繞伊朗的持續動蕩之中，尤其體現在霍爾木茲海峽等咽喉要道的持續中心地位之中。這些案例共同表明，盡管“轉型”話語日益高漲，全球能源體系仍然深深受制于化石燃料控制的政治邏輯。

If the preceding section identified the strategic collision between energy transition and geopolitical rivalry, the next step is to observe how that collision is being played out across concrete theaters of crisis. The contradiction is no longer abstract. It is visible in the war in Ukraine, in the renewed strategic relevance of Venezuela and Iraq, in the persistent volatility surrounding Iran, and above all in the continued centrality of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Together, these cases reveal that the global energy system remains deeply structured by the politics of fossil control, even as the language of transition grows louder.

歐洲尋找能源供應的過程，成為更廣泛地強化化石燃料—安全秩序的一部分。液化天然氣被賦予更高的戰略重要性，外部供應方獲得了新的杠桿，原本以臨時必要性為理由建設的基礎設施，也開始產生更長期的影響。表面上看，這些措施是應急反應；但在氣候危機要求更堅決擺脫化石燃料之際，它們也產生了維持化石能源依賴的效果。歐洲并沒有放棄轉型，但轉型被迫與一種安全恐慌共存，而這種恐慌強化的，恰恰是歐洲原本應當逃離的舊體系。

Europe’s search for supply became part of a wider reinforcement of the fossil-security order. Liquefied natural gas assumed greater strategic importance. External suppliers acquired new leverage. Infrastructure once justified as temporary necessity began to generate longer-term implications. What was presented as an emergency response also had the effect of preserving fossil dependence at the very moment when the climate crisis required sharper departure from it. Europe did not abandon the transition, but the transition was forced to coexist with a security panic that strengthened the old system from which it was supposed to be escaping.

這一發展本身的意義并不局限于歐洲。歐洲對能源的迫切需求并不是孤立存在的；它會傳導至全球市場，并加劇圍繞稀缺供應的競爭。它還幫助正當化了一種更廣泛的政治敘事，即把化石燃料擴張辯護為應對不穩定局勢的理性選擇。

That development matters beyond Europe itself. Europe’s energy thirst does not operate in isolation; it reverberates through global markets and deepens competition for scarce supply. It also helps legitimize a wider political narrative in which fossil expansion is defended as a rational answer to instability.

從這個意義上說，歐洲既是地緣政治能源擾動的受害者，也是化石燃料—安全邏輯再生產的參與者。歐洲越是不安全，就越會強化碳氫能源、航運路線和外部供應方在全球層面的重要性。而這種邏輯越是得到強化，就越難以把氣候轉型作為國際能源政策中壓倒一切的組織原則。

In this sense, Europe becomes both a casualty of geopolitical energy disruption and a participant in the reproduction of the fossil-security logic. The more insecure Europe becomes, the more it reinforces the global importance of hydrocarbons, shipping routes, and external suppliers. And the more that logic is reinforced, the harder it becomes to treat climate transition as the overriding organizing principle of international energy policy.

烏克蘭戰爭還在第二層意義上改變了戰略地圖。它再次證明，能源始終與脅迫、聯盟管理和全球權力站隊密不可分。能源并不僅僅是沖突的后果；它本身就是沖突運行的場域之一。對供應的控制、制裁、價格沖擊以及替代供應格局，都成為這場戰爭向戰場之外輻射影響的工具。也正因如此，能源轉型不能被視為一個純粹技術性或環境性的問題。只要能源體系仍然容易受到地緣政治斷裂的沖擊，各國政府就會繼續優先選擇那些它們認為可以被保障、被控制，或受到軍事保護的供應形式。

The war in Ukraine also altered the strategic map in a second sense. It reaffirmed that energy remains inseparable from coercion, alliance management, and global power alignment. Energy is not merely a consequence of conflict; it is one of its operating terrains. Control over supply, sanctions, price shocks, and substitution patterns all became tools through which the war radiated beyond the battlefield. This is precisely why the transition cannot be treated as a purely technical or environmental matter. As long as energy systems remain vulnerable to geopolitical rupture, governments will continue to privilege forms of supply they believe can be secured, controlled, or militarily protected.

同樣的邏輯也可以在西半球看到。委內瑞拉長期以來在華盛頓被視為政治上高度敏感的對象，但每當供應形勢趨緊，或地緣政治靈活性變得有用時，它又會周期性地重新進入戰略計算之中。這并不是一個偶然的矛盾。它揭示出，當化石能源重新獲得緊迫性時，規范性話語可以多么迅速地被重新校準。

That same logic is visible in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela, long treated as politically radioactive in Washington, periodically re-enters strategic calculation whenever supply conditions tighten or geopolitical flexibility becomes useful. This is not an incidental contradiction. It reveals how quickly normative language can be recalibrated when fossil energy regains urgency.

一個受到制裁的產油國，可能突然再次變得重要，并不是因為其治理狀況發生了根本變化，而是因為其資源仍然嵌入全球安全方程之中。同樣，更廣泛的模式也適用于伊拉克。伊拉克的重要性之所以延續，并不僅僅因為它擁有能源儲備，也因為它身處一個能源、安全架構和大國競爭高度交織的地區。

A sanctioned producer can suddenly become relevant again, not because its governance has fundamentally changed, but because its resources remain embedded in a global security equation. The same broader pattern applies to Iraq, whose importance persists not only because of its reserves, but because it sits within a region where energy, security architecture, and great-power competition remain closely interlinked.

因霍爾木茲海峽封閉，伊拉克石油出口受阻，經敘利亞轉運出海成為替代方案之一。圖源：路透社

伊朗則進一步凸顯了這一圖景。很少有案例能像伊朗這樣清楚地說明，化石能源、戰略地理與地緣政治對抗依然緊密交織在一起。伊朗之所以重要，不僅因為其擁有碳氫資源，也因為它所處的位置，以及它能夠威脅的對象。霍爾木茲海峽并不只是一個狹窄的海上通道，它是全球化石能源經濟的動脈之一。那里任何不穩定，都將遠遠超出海灣地區本身，影響亞洲、歐洲和美國的能源價格、市場心理、保險成本、航運安排和戰略規劃。霍爾木茲正是地理本身轉化為杠桿的地方。

Iran sharpens the picture further. Few cases better illustrate how fossil energy, strategic geography, and geopolitical confrontation remain fused. Iran matters not only because of its hydrocarbons, but because of where it sits and what it can threaten. The Strait of Hormuz is not simply a narrow maritime corridor. It is one of the arteries of the global fossil economy. Any instability there reverberates far beyond the Gulf, affecting prices, market psychology, insurance costs, shipping calculations, and strategic planning across Asia, Europe, and the United States. Hormuz is where geography itself becomes leverage.

這一點對于中國而言尤其重要。中國在可再生能源和電氣化領域的推進，并沒有消除其對進口化石燃料的持續需求。中國經濟的規模仍然需要大量石油和天然氣投入，其中相當一部分暴露在海上運輸路線和政治不穩定地區之中。這意味著，全球向可再生能源轉型，并未消解化石能源咽喉要道的戰略價值。相反，這些咽喉要道仍然是競爭對手計算壓力、暴露程度和約束能力的工具。在這樣一個世界里，正因為新能源秩序尚未完全形成，對舊能源秩序的控制才依然具有巨大意義。

This is especially significant in relation to China. China’s advance in renewable energy and electrification does not eliminate its continued need for imported fossil fuel. Its economic scale still requires substantial oil and gas inputs, much of them exposed to maritime routes and politically unstable regions. That means the global shift toward renewables has not yet dissolved the strategic value of fossil chokepoints. On the contrary, these chokepoints remain instruments through which rivals can calculate pressure, exposure, and constraint. In such a world, control over the old energy order retains immense relevance precisely because the new one is not yet complete.

由此浮現出來的，已經不只是一組地區危機，而是一張棋盤。在這張棋盤上，不同危機場域服務于一種共同的戰略功能。烏克蘭暴露了能源依賴型歐洲的脆弱性，并重新激活了應急化石能源供應的政治邏輯；委內瑞拉提醒人們，資源獲取可以迅速壓倒政治一致性；伊拉克則表明，那些不穩定但不可或缺的產油國仍然具有持續重要性；伊朗和霍爾木茲則揭示，海上咽喉要道仍然是管理全球能源不安全的核心環節。在這些案例中，同一種模式反復出現：每當能源安全變得緊迫，化石能源體系便重新獲得戰略優先地位，而氣候邏輯則被推到一旁。

What emerges, then, is something more than a set of regional crises. It is a chessboard on which different theaters serve a common strategic function. Ukraine exposes the vulnerability of energy-dependent Europe and revives the politics of emergency fossil supply. Venezuela reminds us that resource access can quickly override political consistency. Iraq demonstrates the continued relevance of unstable but indispensable producers. Iran and Hormuz reveal that maritime chokepoints remain central to the management of global energy insecurity. Across these cases, the same pattern recurs: whenever energy security becomes urgent, fossil systems regain strategic primacy, and climate logic is pushed to the side.

其后果令人警醒。每一次新的地緣政治沖擊，都會強化這樣一種主張：必須保護供應、實現進口多元化、擴大能源戰略儲備、保障運輸通道，并鞏固舊有能源伙伴關系。然而，這些措施雖然在眼前安全邏輯下具有合理性，卻也延長了氣候行動被置于次要位置的條件。世界由此陷入一種反復循環：地緣政治危機重新喚起化石燃料的緊迫性；化石燃料的緊迫性延緩或稀釋能源轉型；被延緩的轉型加深氣候不穩定；而氣候不穩定又反過來加劇對能源安全的爭奪。

The consequence is sobering. Every new geopolitical shock strengthens the argument for protecting supply, diversifying imports, expanding strategic reserves, securing routes, and reinforcing old energy partnerships. But these measures, while rational within the logic of immediate security, also prolong the conditions under which climate action becomes secondary. The world becomes trapped in a repeating cycle: geopolitical crisis revives fossil urgency; fossil urgency delays or dilutes transition; delayed transition deepens climate instability; and climate instability, in turn, intensifies the scramble for secure energy.

從這個意義上說，歐洲、烏克蘭、委內瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗和霍爾木茲，并不是世界政治中彼此分離的章節。它們是同一個未解現實相互關聯的表現：國際體系仍在通過那些正在制造全球性不安全的結構來尋求安全。只要這一矛盾沒有被直接面對，能源安全就會繼續在地緣政治競爭中被重新定義，而能源轉型也將始終處于脆弱狀態。這種脆弱并不只是因為能力不足或政治意愿不夠，而是因為延緩本身可能具有戰略價值。

In this sense, Europe, Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and Hormuz are not separate chapters of world politics. They are interconnected expressions of the same unresolved reality: the international system still seeks security through structures that are helping to produce planetary insecurity. Until that contradiction is addressed directly, energy security will continue to be redefined through geopolitical rivalry, and the transition will remain vulnerable, not simply because of insufficient capacity or inadequate political will, but because delay itself may carry strategic value.

能源轉型的延遲，并不只是推遲氣候目標的實現；它也會延后中國在未來能源產業中崛起所帶來的地緣政治收益。從這一角度看，轉型過程中的延宕或擾亂，可能具有戰略價值；而以化石燃料為基礎的舊秩序延續，對美國而言也不只是發揮防御性作用。通過延長石油、天然氣和關鍵咽喉要道的中心地位，它不僅可能維持美國的戰略杠桿，也可能減緩中國將其在可再生能源領域的領先地位轉化為更廣泛結構性權力的能力。

A delayed energy transition does not simply defer climate goals; it also postpones the geopolitical benefits of China’s rise in future energy industries. From this perspective, delay or disruption within the transition may carry strategic value, while the persistence of the fossil-based order can serve more than a defensive role for the United States. By prolonging the centrality of oil, gas, and key chokepoints, it may not only sustain U.S. strategic leverage but also slow China’s ability to convert its leadership in renewables into broader structural power.

從這個意義上說，能源轉型的延遲不僅是氣候行動上的挫折，也可能成為一種戰略性推遲機制，用以延緩中國在新興能源秩序中的上升。

In this sense, a delayed transition is not only a climate setback; it may also function as a strategic deferral of China’s ascent in the emerging energy order.

氣候變化與權力重組

Climate Change and the Reordering of Power

在這場不斷展開的能源危機中，最終攸關的并不只是脫碳的速度，甚至也不只是單獨意義上的全球氣候穩定。更根本的是，世界正在進入這樣一個時期：氣候變化、能源轉型與地緣政治競爭，正匯聚為一場圍繞未來權力分配的斗爭。這正是當前時刻具有歷史分量的原因所在。問題不再只是世界能否足夠迅速地從化石燃料轉向可再生能源，而是這種轉型能否在不動搖現有國際秩序長期依賴的戰略等級結構的情況下發生。

What is ultimately at stake in this unfolding energy crisis is not only the pace of decarbonization, nor even the stability of the global climate taken in isolation. More fundamentally, the world is entering a period in which climate change, energy transition, and geopolitical rivalry are converging into a single struggle over the future distribution of power. This is what gives the current moment its historic weight. The question is no longer simply whether the world can move from fossil fuels to renewable energy quickly enough. It is whether such a transition can occur without destabilizing the strategic hierarchies on which the existing international order has long depended.

正因如此，這一問題不能被簡單歸結為通常意義上的政治意愿不足。障礙要深得多。氣候行動正在同根深蒂固的優勢體系發生碰撞。舊能源秩序并不只是為工業經濟提供動力；它還支撐著聯盟體系、軍事投射、貿易路線、金融影響力和地緣政治依附關系。它塑造了一個可以通過控制開采、定價、供應、保護和準入來行使權力的世界。因此，擺脫這一秩序并不只是采用更清潔的技術，而是動搖現代戰略權力的一項物質基礎。

This is why the problem cannot be reduced to a failure of political will in the ordinary sense. The obstacles are deeper. Climate action is colliding with entrenched systems of advantage. The old energy order did not merely power industrial economies; it underpinned alliances, military reach, trade routes, financial influence, and geopolitical dependency. It created a world in which power could be exercised through control over extraction, pricing, supply, protection, and access. To move away from that order is therefore not simply to adopt cleaner technologies. It is to unsettle one of the material foundations of modern strategic power.

中國在這場轉型中的作用至關重要。中國在可再生能源、電池、電動汽車、電網技術以及產業規模方面的快速推進，使其所處位置已經超出了單純經濟層面的意義。中國已經接近那些可能定義下一輪能源發展時代的關鍵產業制高點。

China’s role in this transformation is central. Its rapid advance in renewable energy, batteries, electric vehicles, grid technology, and industrial scale has given it a position that extends beyond economics. Ithas placed China near the commanding heights of sectors likely to define the next era of energy development.

中國中南部的一座電力傳輸樞紐，它是全球最長、最強的特高壓輸電線路的終點。圖源：紐約時報

這并不意味著中國已經擺脫矛盾，也不意味著中國的能源體系已經進入“后化石燃料”階段。但它確實意味著，如果全球能源轉型加速推進，結構性優勢就可能逐步轉向那些在電氣化產業中占據更有利位置的行為體，而不再主要掌握在舊有碳氫能源主導架構中的優勢方手中。

This does not mean that China has escaped contradiction, nor that its energy system is already post-fossil. But it does mean that the transition, if accelerated globally, could gradually shift structural advantage toward actors that are better positioned in the industries of electrification than in the older architecture of hydrocarbon dominance.

對美國而言，在一定程度上，對其他那些形成于化石能源時代地緣政治邏輯之中的大國而言，這就造成了一種深刻的戰略困境。原則上支持快速脫碳是一回事；接受一場可能重新分配產業、技術和地緣政治優勢的轉型，則是另一回事。

For the United States, and to some extent for other powers formed within the geopolitical logic of the fossil age, this creates a profound strategic dilemma. To support rapid decarbonization in principle is one thing. To accept a transition that may redistribute industrial, technological, and geopolitical advantage is another.

這正是氣候政策常常在話語上得到擁抱、卻在戰略上受到約束的更深層原因。阻力并不總是公開的，也并不總是意識形態化的。它往往表現為拖延、觀望、泛安全化、附條件承諾，或重新強調化石能源體系的韌性。但其累積效果是相同的：能源轉型被放緩，并不只是因為它本身困難重重，也因為它一旦成功，可能以某些行為體并不愿完全接受的方式改變權力平衡。

This is the deeper reason why climate policy so often appears rhetorically embraced yet strategically constrained. Resistance is not always open, nor always ideological. Often it appears in the form of delay, hedging, securitization, conditional commitment, or renewed emphasis on fossil resilience. But the cumulative effect is the same: the transition is slowed not only because it is difficult, but because its success may alter the balance of power in ways that some actors are unwilling fully to accept.

正是在這里，氣候問題與全球秩序問題變得不可分割。如果世界主要由科學必要性來支配，那么脫碳的邏輯早已勢不可擋。物理證據清晰明確，技術路徑也越來越可行，不作為的代價還在持續上升。然而，當前的國際體系并不只按照科學邏輯運行。它還在競爭、不對稱、不安全感以及維護相對優勢的邏輯中運行。氣候科學可以界定問題的緊迫性，卻無法決定政治選擇的優先次序。這些選擇仍然要經過國家持久戰略計算的過濾；各國追問的不只是“什么是必要的”，還有“誰會獲益、誰會受損、誰來主導”。

This is where the climate question becomes inseparable from the question of global order. If the world were governed primarily by scientific necessity, the logic of decarbonization would already be overwhelming. The physical evidence is clear, the technological pathways are increasingly available, and the costs of inaction continue to mount. Yet the international system at this point, does not operate on scientific logic alone. It operates through competition, asymmetry, insecurity, and the preservation of relative advantage. Climate science may define the urgency of the problem, but it does not determine the hierarchy of political choices. Those choices are filtered through the enduring calculations of states that still ask not only what is necessary, but who gains, who loses, and who leads.

從這一角度看，最大的危險或許并不是傳統意義上對氣候變化的否認，而是這樣一個世界的出現：氣候擾動被充分承認，卻仍然從屬于戰略競爭。在這樣的世界里，各國政府可能會投資于氣候適應、綠色技術、韌性建設和選擇性脫碳，同時在化石燃料杠桿仍具有地緣政治效用的地方繼續加以保留。其結果是在一個競爭性體系中采取碎片化行動；在這個體系中，國家優勢受到的保護，比地球穩定本身更為堅決。這是一種更隱蔽、也可能更持久的失敗形式。

Seen in this light, the greatest danger may not be denial of climate change in the traditional sense. It may be the emergence of a world in which climate disruption is fully acknowledged, yet still subordinated to strategic rivalry. In such a world, governments may invest in adaptation, green technology, resilience, and selective decarbonization, while continuing to preserve fossil leverage wherever it remains geopolitically useful. The result would not be total inaction. It would be fragmented action within a competitive system that protects national advantage more fiercely than planetary stability.That is a far more subtle and perhaps more durable form of failure.

歐洲的位置再次說明了這種緊張關系。歐洲試圖在氣候規范和監管雄心方面發揮引領作用，但其能源不安全又反復將其拉回供應依賴和地緣政治脆弱性的嚴峻現實之中。中國試圖在未來產業中取得領導地位，卻仍然暴露在化石燃料瓶頸和海上風險之下。美國推動清潔創新，卻仍然從一個碳氫能源、制裁、海上通道和產油國影響力依舊居于中心的世界中獲得戰略收益。

Europe’s position once again illustrates this tension. It seeks to lead on climate norms and regulatory ambition, yet its energy insecurity repeatedly pulls it back into the hard realities of supply dependence and geopolitical vulnerability. China seeks leadership in the industries of the future, yet remains exposed to fossil bottlenecks and maritime risk. The United States promotes clean innovation, yet continues to derive strategic benefit from a world in which hydrocarbons, sanctions, sea lanes, and producer influence remain central.

因此，每一個主要行為體都被困在一種矛盾之中：一邊是它所宣示的能源未來，另一邊是它仍然身處其中的戰略現實。相應地，氣候危機已經不再只是排放問題，也關乎新能源秩序將在何種政治條件下被建立起來。Each major actor is therefore caught in a contradiction between the energy future it proclaims and the strategic present it still inhabits. Accordingly, the climate crisis is no longer only about emissions, it is also about the political terms under which a new energy order will be built.

挑戰并不只是加快能源轉型，而是防止轉型被大國競爭所驅動。如果可再生能源淪為又一個競爭場域，脫碳進程就可能以不均衡且過于緩慢的方式推進，難以遏制不斷升級的全球性動蕩。相反，如果能源轉型不被理解為一場零和式的權力轉移，而是被視為構建更穩定國際秩序的基礎，它就可能為擺脫“化石燃料—安全陷阱”提供一條出路。然而，要實現這一結果，需要一種當前仍然匱乏的政治想象力。

The challenge is not just to accelerate the transition, but to prevent it from being driven by rivalry. If renewable energy becomes another arena of competition, decarbonization may proceed unevenly and too slowly to limit escalating global disruption. If, instead, the transition is framed not as a zero-sum shift in power but as the foundation of a more stable international order, it could offer a way out of the fossil-security trap. That outcome, however, demands a level of political imagination that is currently lacking.

因此，氣候變化危機與秩序危機已經不可分割。舊有化石燃料體系在環境上不可持續，而新的能源體系尚未完全形成，就已經在地緣政治上陷入爭奪。二者之間，正是我們這個時代的核心斗爭：人類究竟能否建設一個由地球整體必要性所指引的能源未來，還是說，這一未來將被一個碎片化世界中的種種競爭所扭曲、延宕，并被武器化。

The crisis of climate change is therefore inseparable from a crisis of order. The old fossil system is environmentally unsustainable, yet the new energy system is geopolitically contested before it is fully formed. Between the two lies the central struggle of our time: whether humanity can build an energy future guided by planetary necessity, or whether that future will be distorted, delayed, and weaponized by the rivalries of a fractured world.

圖源：路透社

結論

Conclusion

氣候危機常常被表述為一個科學、技術和政治意愿問題。但這種框架已經不再充分。本文所要論證的是，氣候變化如今已經置身于一場更大范圍的地緣政治斗爭之中，這場斗爭圍繞能源、權力和戰略優勢展開。向可再生能源的轉型，并不是在一個中性的政策空間中展開的。它發生在一個碎片化的國際體系之中，在這個體系中，各國繼續計算的不僅是環境必要性，還有相對收益、依賴關系、杠桿和控制權。

The climate crisis is often presented as a problem of science, technology, and political will. But that framing is no longer sufficient. What this article has argued is that climate change now sits inside a much larger geopolitical struggle over energy, power, and strategic advantage. The transition to renewable energy is not unfolding in a neutral policy space. It is taking place in a fractured international system in which states continue to calculate not only environmental necessity, but also relative gain, dependency, leverage, and control.

這正是能源安全與氣候行動之間的矛盾變得如此尖銳的原因。問題并不只是各國政府未能按照氣候科學的要求一以貫之地行動，而是現有能源秩序仍然提供著主要大國不愿放棄的戰略收益。化石燃料依然同軍事投射、制裁、咽喉要道、聯盟體系和影響力網絡相聯系。相比之下，可再生能源則指向產業和地緣政治優勢的重新分配；在新興能源經濟的關鍵領域中，中國已經取得了顯著領先。

That is why the contradiction between energy security and climate action has become so acute. The issue is not merely that governments fail to act consistently on what climate science requires. It is that the existing energy order still provides strategic benefits that major powers are reluctant to surrender. Fossil fuels remain tied to military reach, sanctions, chokepoints, alliances, and systems of influence. Renewable energy, by contrast, points toward a redistribution of industrial and geopolitical advantage, one in which China has already secured a significant lead in key sectors of the emerging energy economy.

從這一角度看，氣候行動的延宕并不總是無知、否認或制度乏力的產物。它也可能反映出一種更深層的戰略邏輯：維護一種仍在服務地緣政治目的的能源架構，哪怕這種架構正在加劇生態不穩定。本文所考察的戰爭、危機和壓力點——無論是烏克蘭、委內瑞拉、伊拉克、伊朗、霍爾木茲，還是歐洲的能源脆弱性——都不是氣候敘事邊緣的孤立擾動。它們本身就是氣候敘事的一部分。它們揭示出這樣一個世界：國際體系仍在通過那些正在加劇地球不安全的結構來尋求安全。

From this perspective, climate delay is not always the product of ignorance, denial, or institutional weakness alone. It can also reflect a deeper strategic logic: the preservation of an energy architecture that continues to serve geopolitical purposes even as it drives ecological instability. The wars, crises, and pressure points examined in this article be it Ukraine, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Hormuz, and Europe’s energy vulnerability, are not separate disturbances on the margins of the climate story. They are part of the climate story. They reveal a world still seeking security through the very structures that are worsening planetary insecurity.

這才是真正的危險。能源轉型或許會繼續推進，但可能以一種被扭曲的形式推進：被競爭拖慢，被不安全感碎片化，并從屬于大國博弈的棋局。在這樣的世界里，脫碳并不會停止，但它不再主要由科學緊迫性所支配。相反，它會被卷入一場關于誰將塑造下一輪能源秩序、誰將主導其戰略后果的斗爭之中。

This is the real danger. The transition may continue, but in a distorted form: slowed by rivalry, fragmented by insecurity, and subordinated to the chess game of great-power competition. In such a world, decarbonization does not stop, but it ceases to be governed primarily by scientific urgency. Instead, it becomes entangled in the struggle over who will shape the next energy order and who will dominate its strategic consequences.

因此，我們這個時代的核心問題，已經不再只是世界是否會擺脫化石燃料，而是世界能否在轉型本身被地緣政治沖突俘獲之前做到這一點。一旦發生這種情況，氣候變化就不再只是環境緊急狀態。它將成為新一輪權力等級結構被爭奪和塑造的場域。

The central question of our time, then, is no longer simply whether the world will move beyond fossil fuels. It is whether it can do so before the transition itself is captured by geopolitical conflict. If that happens, climate change will no longer be only an environmental emergency. It will become the terrain on which a new hierarchy of power is fought out.

而這或許正是最殘酷的悖論：人類已經知道，為避免更深重的氣候災難必須做什么，卻仍然被困在一個把生存之路轉化為競爭工具的國際體系之中。

And that may be the cruelest paradox of all: that humanity already knows what it must do to avoid deeper climate catastrophe, yet remains trapped in an international system that turns the path to survival into an instrument of rivalry.

梅赫里·馬達爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

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